






























































Governing the Boundaries of the Commonwealth 




In recent years, programmes for so-called assisted voluntary return migra-
tion (AVR) have become an important pillar of European migration policy 
(Broeders 2010).2 These programmes target asylum seekers whose chances 
of admission are considered to be low and, in some cases, rejected asylum 
seekers. They provide advice and financial incentives with the aim of per-
suading these people to agree to return to their countries of origin. A grow-
ing number of studies of migration policy have evaluated and measured the 
effectiveness of these programmes (e.g. Gosh 2000; International Organi-
zation for Migration 2004; Black and Gent 2006; Geiger 2009; Black et al. 
2011). However, few studies have attempted to understand the underlying 
structures and logics of this specific form of migration management, which 
oscillate between deportation and the provision of assistance on humani-
tarian grounds (cf. Hammond 1999; Blitz et al. 2005; Webber 2011; Lietaert 
et al. 2016). 
This chapter discusses the logics of these programmes through an anal-
ysis of the self-representations of counsellors who work in Switzerland's 
return migration bureaucracy. It approaches these self-representations not 
1  This chapter is based on my PhD research project on the governance of clandestine Tu-
nisian migration in the context of Switzerland's assisted voluntary return migration pro-
gramme. The research was supported by the Swiss Scientific National Foundation SNSF. 
2  In this chapter, the term AVR refers to a specific form of migration management in the form 
of these government programmes. It does not imply consent or agreement with the pur-
ported voluntary nature of these programmes. 
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primarily as individual expressions of personal attitudes, but rather as a 
ref lection of the conf licting bureaucratic ethics that provide moral legiti-
misation for concrete bureaucratic practices. Whereas several studies have 
highlighted the messy, conf licting reality of migration bureaucracy and its 
domination by various interests and actors (e.g. Eule 2014; Cabot 2013), I 
also see the effects of a structural incommensurability between bureaucra-
cy's universal promises and the governance of commonwealth boundaries. 
An ideal-typical bureaucracy serves for the benefit of everyone. The critical 
question is therefore: Who is part of the commonwealth and included in 
“everyone”? Usually this question is beyond the scope of bureaucracies and 
allocated to the realm of politics in a Rancièrian sense (see Rancière 1999). In 
the case of migration bureaucracies, however, structural incommensurabil-
ity occurs because the object of administration is precisely the formation and 
delimitation of the commonwealth, and this undermines bureaucracy's uni-
versalistic claim. The structural incommensurability of migration bureau-
cracy generates its necessarily exclusionary logics.
AVR operates against a backdrop of – and often hand in hand with – 
forced deportation. Since its success depends on the threat of coercion, there 
is a permanent need to legitimate AVR and to position it in the field of migra-
tion management in relation to forced deportation. In order to explore these 
tensions, I focus primarily on the self-representations of return migration 
bureaucrats. These officials are well aware that “deportability” (de Genova 
2002) is indispensable for AVR as a whole as well as for their individual 
professional success. At the same time, they assume an ambivalent stance 
towards coercive measures: either they consider each forced deportation to 
be a failed AVR, and therefore as a professional failure, or they obfuscate the 
relationship between AVR and forced deportation. In the latter case, officials 
argue that they are only consultants, independently and objectively inform-
ing their clients – i.e. the migrants – about their rights, duties, constraints 
and opportunities.
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the notion of bureaucratic ethics, 
asking in what ways the ethics of migration bureaucracies differ from the 
ethics of other bureaucracies. The second part explores the context of AVR, 
and how this specific field within migration bureaucracy as a whole oper-
ates at the intersection between coercion and voluntariness. The third part 
focuses on the self-representations of return migration bureaucrats in Swit-
zerland and shows via ethnographic analysis how their self-representations 
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relate to different bureaucratic ethics. Finally, I return to the paradox of vol-
untariness based on coercion and link it to the conf licting bureaucratic eth-
ics of return migration bureaucrats, which causes the structural incommen-
surability between bureaucracy's universal promise and the administration 
of commonwealth boundaries. 
This chapter draws on ethnographic material I collected between 2012 
and 2016 during my PhD research project on the governance of clandestine 
Tunisian migration in the context of Switzerland's assisted voluntary return 
migration programme. My research reconstructs the transnational trajec-
tories of Tunisian migrants – so-called harragas – confronted with govern-
mental attempts to organise transnational mobility via AVR programmes.3 
In this chapter, I focus on interviews with representatives of five return 
migration offices in different cantons in Switzerland. Additional observa-
tions and analysis of documents help to clarify the logics of the return migra-
tion bureaucracy. 
Bureaucratic ethics and the specific case 
of migration bureaucracies
Setting aside the debate on Weber's bureaucratic ethos (see Weber 1922: 
655ff; Eckert this volume) – interpreted either as imbued with ethics (see du 
Gay 2008), or potentially becoming devoid of ethics (e.g. Arendt 1995, Bau-
man 1989; Habermas 1988; Bayertz 1995: 35f) – I address the question of eth-
ics by examining the aims and values that migration bureaucracies strive to 
uphold. This approach follows the notion of bureaucracy in Bear and Mathur 
(2015), who identify two prominent characteristics: the administration of 
public goods and the pursuit of a utopian social order. 
3  The term harraga is widely used in Tunisia and other North African countries, where it 
refers to the high-risk migration strategy of crossing the Mediterranean clandestinely in 
small fishing boats. Harraga has a number of dif ferent meanings: On the one hand, it de-
notes the act of clandestine migration by boat. At the same time, it refers to people who 
perform the “harraga”. The term literally means “burning” or “those who burn”, implying a 
clandestine border crossing (“burning the border”), the people who cross the border, or the 
act of destroying one's personal papers during the clandestine crossing, a common prac-
tice to conceal one's identity from state authorities.
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Bureaucracies are also expressions of an implicit social contract between 
citizens and officials. According to Bear and Mathur, they share four main 
elements. First, bureaucracies geared towards the public good work by pro-
moting goods and services in the commonwealth according to predefined 
sets of rules. Second, a delineated commonwealth has the legitimate right to 
participate in the public good governed by the bureaucracies. In most cases, 
this right is expressed in the notion of the citizen (see Ferguson 2015).4 Third, 
the definition of citizen mediates the relationship between individuals and 
officials, who enact the relationship between individuals and the state. And 
finally, bureaucratic practice is oriented towards an imagined utopian social 
order. This last element contains normative aspects and tells us how society 
should be. For the interpretation of migration bureaucracies, this last aspect 
is of particular importance. 
Migration bureaucracies share distinct features that set them apart from 
other bureaucracies. They are characterised by competing logics and agency 
turf wars (see Eule 2014; Eule et al. 2017), and by illegibility (Hoag 2010). Even 
though these aspects can be found in virtually any bureaucracy, they appear 
to be particularly pronounced in migration bureaucracies. Yet, a further 
aspect points toward a structural difference. Migration bureaucracies are 
geared towards the governance of inclusion and exclusion (Tuckett 2018). 
Thus, its object of governance is the commonwealth itself, and not any public 
good. It differentiates those who are part of the commonwealth from those 
who are excluded from it. This creates a unique disposition. Those who are 
excluded from the commonwealth by the migration bureaucracy are both 
under its governance, and at the same time removed from its realm and 
placed beyond its reach due to their excluded status. To illustrate this point, 
compare the migration bureaucracy to a social welfare bureaucracy: Every-
one who is part of the commonwealth is a potential beneficiary of the welfare 
bureaucracy. Whether one is actually entitled to benefit from the goods and 
services it governs depends on a series of criteria one has to meet (e.g. lack 
of income, lack of private wealth, further indications of social vulnerabil-
ity). However, unlike migration bureaucracies, this differentiation does not 
question one's inclusion in the commonwealth and entitlement, in principle, 
to these social welfare goods if predefined criteria are met. 
4  This resonates with Arendt's (1986) idea of citizenship as the right to have rights, when we 
include in the notion of the public good not only goods and services, but also rights. 
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One might object that migration bureaucracy's public good is precisely 
the entitlement to participate legitimately as a full member of the common-
wealth – to share in the public good. However, this argument would intro-
duce a sort of second order of public good. Furthermore, it would conf late 
the distinction between rights/entitlements and public goods.
In the ethnographic material, the ethics of AVR appear as principles and 
aims such as “protecting the system against abuses”, “enforcing the law”, 
and “governing migration in a humanitarian way”. In order to explore this 
specific character of return migration bureaucracies in more detail, the 
following sections examine the case of Switzerland's AVR programmes not 
only as a specific type of bureaucracy, but as a specific area within migration 
bureaucracies. 
Governing return migration: Switzerland’s AVR programme 
for Tunisian asylum seekers
In June 2012, Switzerland launched an AVR programme for Tunisian asy-
lum seekers: the Länderprogramm Tunesien (country programme Tunisia).5 
This programme provided financial and professional support to individual 
and collective return projects for Tunisian asylum seekers. These small-scale 
economic projects were mainly located in the agricultural sector (sheep and 
cattle breeding, vegetable growing), the small-scale fishing industry, or in 
skilled crafts and trades. This AVR programme attempted to respond to the 
increasing number of Tunisian asylum seekers appearing after the Ben Ali 
regime in Tunisia fell on 14 January 2011. The ensuing turmoil and crumbling 
security apparatus opened a window of opportunity for mostly young male 
Tunisians to leave the country comparatively easily. As so-called harragas, 
they left their homeland clandestinely and reached northern Mediterranean 
shores in old fishing vessels. From there, they moved northwards. At the 
same time, earlier Tunisian migrants who were employed in Italy's shadow 
5  Switzerland has two types of assisted return. The “country programmes” (Länderprogramm) 
provide assistance for a limited period, of ten consist of relatively generous financial sup-
port that may be accompanied by the establishment of support capacities. The other is 
individual return assistance. With some reservations, any asylum seeker can apply for the 
latter. In general, individual return assistance provides smaller amounts of financial sup-
port with little additional support.
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economy joined the migration northwards to escape the consequences of the 
2008 global financial crisis, which hit Italy's economy hard. Thus, two groups 
of Tunisian migrants applied for asylum in Switzerland and surrounding 
countries, and caused a sharp rise in asylum applications between 2011 and 
2013. 
June 2012 is often considered the beginning of what has become known 
as the contemporary migration crisis.6 The Länderprogramm Tunesien 
responded to this supposed crisis, but earlier AVR programmes had already 
existed.7 In institutional terms, they can be traced back to the second half of 
the 1990s in Switzerland. Before that time, return aid was granted randomly 
to individual return migrants, with no distinct legal basis.8 It consisted 
mainly of unofficial assistance to destitute return migrants in the form of 
plane tickets or small amounts of money to alleviate individual hardship 
after their return (Kaser and Schenker 2008). 
The attempt to integrate an AVR approach into Switzerland's migration 
policy is closely linked to the end of the Balkan wars. At that time, Switzer-
land terminated temporary collective protection for people displaced by war. 
Suddenly, the thousands of refugees remaining in Switzerland were denied 
subsidiary protection. Lacking valid residence titles, their stay in Switzer-
land no longer had a legal basis. The consequence was mass expulsion. In 
order to ease the situation for individual returnees, but also to facilitate 
and accelerate returns, an AVR programme to Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
launched as a pilot project in 1996, with assistance from the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) (Kaser and Schenker 2008: 208). 
Since then, Switzerland has implemented more than ten Länderpro-
gramme. This includes programmes for Sri Lanka (2000-2004), Angola 
(2002-2007) and Armenia (2004-2008). Country programmes focus on asy-
lum seekers of a particular nationality for a limited period of time so that 
a joint effort on the part of the migration bureaucracy may decrease their 
numbers in the asylum system. One can identify three main reasons why 
6  The popular crisis discourse, however, is not only questionable, producing a permanent 
“border spectacle” (de Genova 2013, see also Andersson 2016), it also has a short-term 
memory. Today, the 2015 “refugee crisis” has already superseded the 2012 “crisis”, which, 
today, is nothing more than a faint memory in public discourse. 
7  For an overview of AVR in Europe see also Lietaert et al. (2016). 
8  The origins of assisted return migration can be traced back to the year 1959 (Kaser and 
Schenker 2008).
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migration bureaucrats consider AVR as the easiest possible way to expel asy-
lum seekers, illegalised migrants and rejected asylum seekers. AVR does not 
risk violating the fundamental human rights principle of non-refoulement, 
as every returnee signs a document stating that he or she “returns volun-
tarily to the country of origin”. This document is bureaucratic evidence of 
the returnee's free decision to return home. In addition, countries of ori-
gin, which are often reluctant to accept their deported citizens, or may even 
forcibly reject them, are more willing to comply with assisted return. Finally, 
AVR is less costly than forced deportation. 
In recent years, expelling rejected asylum seekers and migrants with-
out residence permits has become a political priority in many European 
countries. As Broeders (2010) observes, this policy has led to contradictory 
results: Capacity for administrative detention has increased, while at the 
same time the effective number of expulsions has stagnated or even fallen 
(see also Castañeda 2010). This means that the “deportability” (de Genova 
2010) of thousands of migrants across Europe does not lower the numbers of 
undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers. Instead, increasing 
numbers are living in a state of legal uncertainty and the everyday threat of 
deportation. Assisted return operates precisely in the milieu of this everyday 
insecurity, offering an end to this precarious and uncertain status. Against 
the backdrop of forced deportation, assisted voluntary return might become 
an option worth considering for Tunisian asylum seekers, although it con-
tradicts the initial intentions that motivated their clandestine migration. 
The double vocation of return counsellors
Since AVR works against the backdrop of forced deportation, a series of 
appraisals has argued that AVR, in fact, is nothing more than poorly masked 
coercion and forced deportation. Instead of replicating this important cri-
tique once again, I focus on Switzerland's AVR programmes as a case study, 
examining return migration bureaucrats' self-representations to explore the 
tension between voluntariness and coercion that results from competing 
bureaucratic ethics.
As part of my research on Switzerland's Tunisian AVR programme, I 
conducted a series of interviews with return counsellors. At the beginning 
of these conversations, my informants often talked a lot about how they 
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conceive of their own work. It was striking to observe how their self-repre-
sentation systematically invoked the ideal-type of the Weberian bureaucrat. 
They described asylum bureaucracy as a machine-like system that processes 
applications with precision, consistency and impartiality. Their role con-
sisted in keeping the system running as smoothly as possible. This template 
can be found in the self-representation of any of my informants. But as the 
conversations unfolded, it quickly became obvious that return migration 
bureaucracy – in its practice, but also in its very conception – does not cor-
respond to this Weberian ideal at all, as is shown in the following example, 
reconstructed from my field notes. 
I was sitting in one of Switzerland's return migration offices, interview-
ing two bureaucrats about their work.9 The office was located on the ground 
f loor in a side wing of the canton's security and police department, sharing 
its reception area with the migration service (Migrationsamt), who admin-
ister bureaucratic affairs relating to foreigners in Switzerland.10 Decorated 
with a few posters of unidentifiable foreign destinations, the office faintly 
resembled a travel agency. In one corner near the entrance, a rack contained 
AVR information brochures in a number of languages. One of my two infor-
mants leafed through a pile of documents he had prepared for our conversa-
tion and pulled out an image. It was a f lowchart, representing Switzerland's 
asylum procedure schematically. He handed me the chart, pointing with his 
pencil to the bottom, and began to explain: “Our task is [to ensure] that asy-
lum seekers with negative [asylum] decisions leave Switzerland.” The head of 
department – also present in the room – added: 
We do not like forced deportations. I am convinced that we all want to avoid 
forced deportations. Our aim is that every rejected asylum seeker returns 
voluntarily to his home country. […] As you know, I am just here to enforce 
negative decisions. I do not make [asylum] decisions. And I am not part of the 
police forces. So, I try to convince the migrants for their own sake to return to 
their country of origin.11
9  Fieldnotes August 2014, clarifications in brackets by D.L. 
10  The Migrationsamt is the cantonal migration authority. It is responsible for the registra-
tion of the non-national population and executes decisions of the federal State Secretar-
iat for Migration. 
11  Interview August 2014, clarifications in brackets by D.L.
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During our conversation, the two informants repeated on several occasions 
that they tried hard to avoid forced deportations. These efforts paid off, the 
department head proudly explained. His canton's return migration office 
had had the highest proportion of AVRs to asylum seekers in recent years. 
The self-representations of these two informants contain three constitu-
tive elements typical of this field: They highlight their duty to enforce neg-
ative asylum decisions; they voice their disapproval of forced deportations, 
while nonetheless defending them as indispensable; and they stress that they 
suggest the best possible solutions for the asylum seekers they advise. Yet, the 
weighting of these three elements varies among return migration bureau-
crats. Apart from individual preferences, this variance largely depends 
on the location of each officer's AVR office within the national migration 
bureaucracy. This becomes apparent when different cases are compared. 
In this particular case, the two informants were both committed to 
enforcing the rules and considered themselves submissive servants to these 
rules. They both argued that the AVR office contributes to enforcing deci-
sions made previously within the limits of the authority of the office, yet each 
officer added nuance in stating his position. The head of department clearly 
prioritised the need to enforce decisions, yet, as the quote shows, argued that 
certain enforcement methods are preferable to others. The return counsel-
lor, for his part, deviated from the clear-cut, rule-oriented narrative of his 
superior and mentioned the importance of working with returnees towards 
mutual consent. 
Strict rule-orientation and as well as the emphasis on mutual consent 
between bureaucrats and asylum seekers are strong expressions of bureau-
cratic ethos. They serve as a kind of guideline for bureaucratic procedures. 
And they show that, although enforcement of negative asylum decisions (i.e. 
returning rejected asylum seekers to their country of origin) is the unques-
tioned and ultimate aim of the return migration bureaucracy, decisions can 
be enforced in different ways, and some ways are better than others. In this 
context, return migration bureaucrats apparently consider so-called volun-
tary return morally preferable to forced deportation. This contributes to the 
moral legitimisation of deportations. 
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Rule-orientation and the public good
Let me take this argument a step further. Rule-orientation always includes 
more than just concern about procedure or, to borrow John Rawls' term, pro-
cedural justice (Rawls 1999: 73-78; see also Nelson 1980). Bureaucrats believe 
that reliance on the principle of rule-orientation in everyday bureaucratic 
practice adds to the public good in substantial ways. This blurs the boundar-
ies between bureaucratic ethos and ethics. Defence of procedural rules and 
principles via strict adherence can be considered an intrinsic aim of bureau-
cracy, and, it follows, also as an element of bureaucratic ethics. It is no coin-
cidence that the return migration bureaucrat quoted in the previous exam-
ple refers to a f lowchart to explain his work. That tool perfectly visualises 
the key idea of bureaucracy: an unambiguous set of actions and decisions 
that is rigorously aligned and follows an exact path. Each action and each 
decision is preceded by a precisely defined previous action or decision, and 
followed by a precisely defined subsequent action or decision. The two core 
principles of bureaucracy represented in the f lowchart are hierarchisation 
and the division of labour (see Handelman 2004). In short, the f lowchart is 
the perfect image of the Weberian ideal-type of bureaucracy. 
When asked why this rule-following principle is so important, return 
counsellors often link it to the issue of fairness. Or, as another informant 
puts it: 
It would be unfair to those who accept a negative asylum decision, if at the 
same time others resist and are rewarded for their misconduct, in the sense 
that they can remain [in the country]. Therefore, it is important to enforce 
negative decisions.12 
Identifying the principle of rule-orientation with fairness indicates that 
more is at stake than concerns about pure procedure. Not enforcing a neg-
ative asylum decision is considered unfair towards rejected asylum seekers 
who accepted their decision and left the country. By this reasoning, render-
ing justice to every asylum seeker means that every bureaucratic decision 
must be enforced, because the scope of fairness includes anyone subjected 
to certain rules. “Fairness” – in the emic meaning captured in the quote – 
12  Interview August 2014, clarification in brackets by D.L.
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corresponds in each case to the idea of coherence throughout the system. 
This means that each individual case is treated exactly the same as all other 
cases with the same characteristics, and that sameness makes the system as 
a whole coherent. Here, the scope transcends the individual case to focus on 
migration bureaucracy as a whole. 
These emic ideas of fairness and coherence contradict a familiar critique 
of bureaucracy which argues that such a strong sense of commitment to 
rules  – as identified in the statement above – implies simultaneous de-re-
sponsibilisation. Commitment to rules does not lead to de-responsibili-
sation from the bureaucrat's perspective. On the contrary, return migra-
tion bureaucrats take the rules seriously precisely because they feel deeply 
responsible for the commonwealth, and thus insist on the coherence of the 
decisions. 
However, defending the principle of rule-orientation does not imply that 
return migration bureaucrats agree with the rules they are enforcing. They 
are well aware that these rules might in some cases lead to questionable 
results. Some civil servants even criticise the actual migration laws more or 
less explicitly.13 They defend rule-orientation by arguing that it guarantees 
equal treatment to every asylum seeker. In other words, they draw a sharp 
distinction between the defence of a procedural principle and justifying the 
actual rules as such. Yet the ethnographic data shows that, in general, return 
migration bureaucrats only criticise the rules they enforce as private indi-
viduals, not in their official roles. This highlights the mode of operation of 
the bureaucratic principle, which disconnects the private from the official, 
as Weber (1999) notes. It prioritises rule-following – and therefore proce-
dural or formal justice – over substantive justice. Openly criticising a deci-
sion made previously would be judged unprofessional, unless this decision is 
the outcome of a violation of bureaucratic rules. 
The idea that the rule-following principle is worth defending contains a 
further aspect. Return migration bureaucrats argue that the rule-following 
principle and the enforcement of negative asylum decisions is “for the benefit 
of everyone”.14 This aspect is different from fairness, as Moore reminds us: 
“Strict rules yield certainty but are sometimes unfair. Equity gives attention 
13  In most cases, this critique is voiced in informal settings. During the interviews, most of 
the informants avoided personal critical statements.
14  Interview with a return migration bureaucrat, July 2014.
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to fairness and morality, but at the expense of legal certainty” (1972: 53). This 
aspect of certainty is crucial, as it goes beyond the individual case at stake. 
Following and enforcing bureaucratic rules correctly and consistently is not 
only an issue between bureaucrats and those immediately concerned with 
a certain bureaucratic rule. It contains the idea that defending the rule-fol-
lowing principle has a much broader impact on society as a whole. Bureau-
crats understand their everyday practice as a contribution to the public good, 
as this Weberian-like ideal-type bureaucracy stands for the fundamental 
principle of justice. As du Gay (2000) argues, neutrality, fairness and equal 
treatment of cases without regard to person form the indispensable condi-
tion of possibility of democracy. This is the bulwark against arbitrariness, 
injustice and unequal treatment. This self-representation assumes that the 
rule-following principle contains an intrinsic value worth defending, as it 
provides the necessary condition of democracy. 
As a guiding principle of bureaucrats' everyday practice, strict rule-ori-
entation exhibits a surprising parallel to Weber's distinction between Gesin-
nungsethik (ethics of conviction) and Verantwortungsethik (ethics of responsi-
bility) (Weber 1922: 237f). Rule-orientation resembles an ethics of conviction 
in the sense that it focuses on rules and ignores the outcomes. Therefore, 
rather than echoing a Bauman-inspired critique of bureaucracy as anethi-
cal, the ethnographic material reveals a migration bureaucracy full of ethical 
considerations, which tend to take the form of an ethics of conviction. 
Rule-orientation is not the only principle to which migration bureaucrats' 
self-representation adheres. The following ethnographic material suggests 
that the principles of efficiency and humanitarian reason contradict – each 
in a distinct way – the neat picture of bureaucracy wherein rule-orientation 
provides an indispensable threshold against arbitrariness and injustice. 
Efficiency versus rule-orientation
Efficiency as a second principle of bureaucratic ethos stands in tension with 
the principle of rule-following path-dependency. I suggest interpreting 
return migration bureaucracy as an institutionalised deviation from strict 
rule-orientation. In contrast to the dominant mode of self-representation 
of virtually all return counsellors, the return migration bureaucracy does 
not enforce negative asylum decisions, but anticipates such decisions for the 
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simple reason that there are no expulsion orders to enforce – so far at least. 
The AVR programme for Tunisia explicitly targets Tunisian asylum seekers 
whose applications are still pending. Why did my interlocutors systemati-
cally overlook this obvious paradox? 
In conversation, I often asked my informants why they emphasised the 
rule-following principle, even though AVR operations are obviously not in 
accord with it. In general, their first reaction was incomprehension. Inter-
locutors rejected my objection as “naïve”. They agreed that potential return 
migrants had not yet received a negative decision on their asylum applica-
tion when so-called voluntary return was proposed to them, yet my objec-
tion seemed “out of touch with reality”. One of the two return migration 
bureaucrats introduced in the first part of this section agreed with his col-
leagues' assessment of my failure of comprehension. Concerning Tunisian 
asylum seekers, he argued, it is “obvious” that their asylum applications are 
“unfounded” and that they will receive a negative decision sooner or later 
anyway. Another informant explained that, for this reason, his office's pol-
icy is to approach every asylum seeker systematically at the “earliest possi-
ble moment” in order to disseminate information about AVR among them. 
Along with many other colleagues, he believed that Tunisian nationals' asy-
lum applications were an “abuse of the system”. 
These reactions show that return counsellors constantly anticipate pro-
cedural outcomes and make guesses about the likelihood of positive deci-
sions. Their anticipations and guesses are mainly informed by State Sec-
retariat for Migration (SEM) statistics on asylum seekers' acceptance rates 
broken down by country of origin: Tunisian asylum seekers rank at the bot-
tom. Their anticipations and guesses are further fuelled by a wide variety of 
notions and prejudices, some based on individual experience, that circulate 
among the return counsellors. Considered in this light, processing Tunisian 
asylum seekers' applications step by step from beginning to end is a waste 
of time. This delegitimisation of Tunisian applications prepares the ground-
work for calls for more efficient procedures. The focus shifts away from a 
thorough examination of every asylum application, scrupulously following 
the prescribed bureaucratic path step by step, and towards reducing costs 
and improving the efficiency of the migration bureaucracy. 
This shift accompanied the proliferation of “audit culture” (Shore and 
Wright 1999; 2015) in public service, which turned the main focus of state 
bureaucracies away from fair procedures and equal treatment and towards 
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efficiency and cost reduction (see Hibou 2012: 46-51). AVR is a result of this 
shift. Yet migration bureaucracy can speed up procedure and skip certain 
administrative steps only with the cooperation of the potential returnees. 
Only an asylum seeker can renounce their legal rights to a thorough exam-
ination of their case and potential appeal of a negative decision by voluntarily 
revoking their asylum application. Hence, it is of the utmost importance for 
the success of AVR that return counsellors and potential returnees reach 
mutual consent, as will be explored in more detail in the next section. 
In contradiction to Weber (1999: 157-234), the return migration bureau-
cracy shows that rule-orientation is not necessarily the basis for an ever more 
efficient bureaucracy. These two principles may even stand in opposition to 
each other. AVR is the attempt to reconcile the two conf licting principles of 
rule-orientation and efficiency and resolve this contradiction. It curtails asy-
lum procedures without breaching rules. Therefore, terms such as “dignity” 
and “informed consent” – the latter explicitly expressed in a signed declara-
tion-of-consent document, a pre-condition for AVR – serve to legitimise this 
non-compliance with strict bureaucratic rule-orientation. 
Enforcing decisions “the human way” versus rule orientation
The two informants in the introductory interview referred to a further 
principle that stands in tension with strict rule-orientation. As the return 
counsellors mentioned, return migration enforcement should be executed 
in “a human way”. Both emphasised in conversation that not a single per-
son in the migration office would prefer forced deportation over so-called 
voluntary return – and not only for reasons of cost-efficiency. In AVR, one 
can observe that the humanitarian argument dominates other self-legit-
imisation strategies. This finds several different forms of expression. In 
addition to the above-mentioned argument that negative decisions should 
be enforced in “a human way”, the phrase “return in dignity” is frequently 
deployed, an expression that is particularly common in the language of the 
IOM.15 But why are return migration bureaucrats inclined to defend AVR by 
mobilising humanitarian arguments rather than referring to cost-efficiency 
15  See the IOM description of assisted voluntary return and reintegration: https://www.iom.
int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration [accessed 12 January 2017].
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or other criteria? A simplistic answer would point out that the humanitar-
ian argument is nothing more than a poor cover-up for a cost-benefit cal-
culation. Forced deportation is expensive and may include pre-deportation 
detention, accompanied f lights or even chartered special f lights. Further-
more, depending on the country of origin, the success of forced deporta-
tion is highly uncertain (see Rosenberger and Küffer 2016).16 Yet this does 
not answer the question of why the humanitarian argument is considered 
more legitimate than the cost-efficiency argument in this particular field of 
bureaucracy. 
The majority of return migration bureaucrats whom I interviewed sin-
cerely care that migrants have the opportunity to return “in dignity” to their 
country of origin, as one of them put it, echoing the IOM's official language. 
For her, “in dignity” means two different things. On the one hand, she asso-
ciates this term with voluntariness. The return decision should be of the 
returnee's free will. And she considered it even more important that return-
ees be able to frame their return as a success and not a failure. A closer look 
at the self-legitimisation strategy of this particular return counsellor fur-
ther illustrates this point. She is the head of a cantonal AVR office. Unlike in 
the first case, this AVR office is not part of the Aliens Police (Fremdenpolizei), 
which is located far away in a different part of town. Instead it belongs to the 
canton's welfare department. This results in a different notion of the office, a 
different professional ethos and a different idea of the relationship between 
civil servants and the public. The rule-enforcing aspect is less apparent, and 
return counsellors consider themselves more as service providers. When I 
asked this return counsellor to describe her own role, she replied: 
Look, my task is precisely not to enforce asylum decisions. My mission as 
a professional social worker is to assist my clients in the realisation of their 
decisions. If they decide to return: Fine, I will help them. If they have other 
plans: Fair enough. I will do what I can. But in that case, my options are lim-
ited, as you can imagine.17 
16  For example, asylum seekers and migration bureaucrats are both well aware that Algeria 
does not accept forced deportations of its citizens. It only takes back those who return 
voluntarily.
17  Interview with a return migration of ficer, August 2014. 
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This informant described her role in substantially different terms from 
those of the two return migration bureaucrats we encountered earlier. In her 
self-representation, the focus is less on the enforcement of rules and deci-
sions, and more on the relationship between the return counsellor and the 
asylum seekers subjected to the migration bureaucracy. She emphasised her 
professional ethos as a social worker who is committed to her clients as well 
as to the office. She regarded the double vocation towards the state and the 
individual migrants as part of the duty of the office, and not as a breach or 
weakening of bureaucratic principles. Therefore, she considered herself less 
as an administrator, and more as a mediator between the constraints of the 
migration bureaucracy and migrants' aspirations. Commitment towards the 
asylum seekers and a desire to take their aspirations seriously are entwined 
in her professional ethos. She emphasises this orientation through her fre-
quent use of the word “client”. This standpoint is different from that of the 
two return counsellors in the initial example who continuously use the term 
“asylum seeker”. At the same time, “client” not only implies a more equal rela-
tionship, it also tends to conceal the structural power asymmetry at work. 
The term suggests that enforcement of previously made decisions stands on 
the same level as migrants' plans for their future. Emphasising consultation 
and help as the AVR's two dominant ideas, the return counsellor described 
her own role as though the return migration bureaucracy had temporarily 
suspended the dominant rule-following principle. Only by disregarding the 
overall logics in which return migration bureaucracy is embedded is it pos-
sible to take this stance.
In defining humanitarian reason, Didier Fassin (2012) describes how the 
language of compassion and suffering has replaced terms of interest, rights 
or justice. One can no longer address claims of the state in the antagonistic 
language of rights and legal entitlements, but only in the submissive mode of 
compassion. In the context of migration, this means that asylum has become 
less and less a legal entitlement, and more an act of benevolent charity in the 
face of unbearable suffering. AVR advances this tendency to remove rights 
from the forefront, as it contributes to replacing a rights-based language 
with the language of care. The return counsellor's statement points exactly 
in this direction. In mobilising a language of empowerment (“[I] assist my 
clients in the realisation of their decisions”) she omits any reference to rights. 
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Conclusion: policing the boundaries of the commonwealth
Thus far, this text has examined three aspects that dominate AVR bureaucrats' 
self-representation: rule-orientation, striving for efficiency and humanitar-
ian reason. The discussion of the ethnographic material has shown that none 
of these aspects can be reduced to procedures – i.e. to bureaucratic ethos 
or to bureaucratic ethics alone. The rule-following principle guarantees 
certainty and predictability. Efficiency can tame excessive rule-orientation 
and aim for fast, lean procedures. And the principle of humanitarian rea-
son attempts to reconcile the other two bureaucratic principles that are pre-
dominantly geared towards the public good with the needs, aspirations and 
wishes of individual asylum seekers subjected to the migration bureaucracy. 
AVR's mediation between common interests and individual claims leads 
us back to the boundaries of the commonwealth, and the structural incom-
mensurability between bureaucracy's universal promises and governance 
of those boundaries. I have argued that bureaucracies are geared towards 
administration of the common good: The primary bureaucratic concern is 
modes of fair and just allocation of goods and services within the common-
wealth, hence one benefits, at least hypothetically, from this administration 
of the common good in virtue of one's individual status as a member of the 
commonwealth. This is true even where a given bureaucratic measure is to 
one's individual detriment. Migration bureaucracies – and AVR in particu-
lar – primarily deal with a different issue: They distinguish those who are 
part of the commonwealth from those who are excluded from it. The targets 
of this bureaucratic administration are not included into the utopian social 
order; they are removed from it. The benefits AVR provides are a substitute 
for the bureaucratic promise of the commonwealth, from which asylum 
seekers are excluded. 
This results in a particular relationship between the return migration 
bureaucracy and the people subject to its attention. Tunisian asylum seekers' 
migration strategies and their asylum applications can be read as a call for 
inclusion in the commonwealth's utopian social order: a social order from 
which they are excluded and which the return migration bureaucracy pro-
tects.18 At the same time, they are affected most directly by these bureaucratic 
18  This argument has been put forward by the thesis of the autonomy of migration (Papado-
poulos et al. 2008; de Genova 2010). It appears in a dif ferent form and a context other than 
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interventions. Migration bureaucracy is structurally unable to incorporate 
these harragas into the utopian social order because it would imply redraw-
ing the commonwealth's boundaries, a power that belongs to the political 
realm, not to the bureaucratic realm. Tunisian harragas call for inclusion 
through their sheer presence in a confrontation of “the logic of equality with 
the logic of the police order” (Rancière 1999: 101). The only two options in this 
Rancièrian political moment are repression and compassion. This structural 
inability of the migration bureaucracy to redraw commonwealth boundaries 
illustrates the aporia of universalism inscribed in bureaucratic ethics. The 
struggle for inclusion in the realm of the universal is always fought for and 
realised by those who are excluded from it (see Buck-Morss 2009). As discus-
sion of the self-representation narratives showed, return migration bureau-
crats must navigate these mutually exclusive claims. The wish to assist Tuni-
sian asylum seekers in realising their own plans for the future collides with 
the exclusionary logic of the migration bureaucracy, which removes them 
from the commonwealth it is charged with protecting. 
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